Kim Jong Un wields “decisive powers” over nuclear weapons, but if the command-and-control system faces threats, missiles may launch “automatically.”
Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, declared that a recent missile test underscores the nation’s willingness to initiate a nuclear assault in response to provocation with strategic weaponry. Observers posit that he is orchestrating the operationalization of such forces, marking the latest development in a series of statements and legislative alterations outlining an expansive, ambiguous, and potentially destabilizing doctrine.
Here’s an exploration of North Korea’s stance on the utilization of its nuclear arsenal:
North Korea asserts its opposition to war, framing its nuclear armament as a means of self-defense necessary for protection against “hostile” policies from Washington, South Korea, and Japan. Kim, in a speech during a military parade, elucidated that the nuclear force’s purpose is to prevent war through deterrence and potentially launch strikes against those violating the North’s “fundamental interests.”
Analysts note the resemblance of these statements to the language employed in the United States’ Nuclear Posture Review, which advocates the use of nuclear weapons to safeguard its “vital interests” or those of its allies. In September 2022, North Korea codified the right to engage in preemptive nuclear strikes for self-protection through new legislation.
Scenarios that could trigger a nuclear response include the imminent threat of a nuclear strike, jeopardy to the country’s leadership, people, or existence, or the pursuit of an advantage during a war. According to the law, Kim wields “decisive powers” over nuclear weapons, but if the command-and-control system faces threats, missiles may launch “automatically.”
State media asserts that the new law prohibits the sharing of nuclear arms or technology with other nations, aiming to diminish the risk of nuclear war by preventing miscalculations among nuclear-armed states and the misuse of such weapons. However, analysts caution that delegating launch authority to lower commanders during a crisis could elevate the likelihood of catastrophic miscalculations.
In September 2023, North Korea further fortified its policy on nuclear forces through a constitutional amendment. Kim pledged to expedite the production of nuclear weapons to deter what he deems as U.S. provocations.
Defense Minister Kang Sun Nam stated in July that the deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers, bombers, or missile submarines in South Korea might meet the criteria for North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons.
Examining potential targets, in 2017, North Korea, following its first successful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch, issued a threat of a nuclear strike on the “heart of the US” if any attempt was made to oust their supreme leadership. The same year, they also threatened to use nuclear weapons to submerge Japan into the sea.
In 2022, Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s influential sister, warned of the North’s readiness to use nuclear weapons if attacked by South Korea. She detailed a scenario wherein North Korea would mobilize its nuclear forces in response to a South Korean attack to “completely dampen the enemy’s war spirits, prevent protracted hostilities, and preserve one’s own military strength.”
While North Korea has refrained from testing nuclear weapons since 2017, analysts believe it likely continued uranium and plutonium production for warheads. An April study estimated Pyongyang’s possession of 31 to 96 nuclear weapons, contingent on the types of devices under construction.
Kim, in 2021, asserted North Korea’s capability to “miniaturize, lighten, and standardize nuclear weapons.” In January 2023, he announced plans to “exponentially expand” the nuclear arsenal and “mass produce” tactical nuclear weapons.
North Korea has progressed in developing new missiles for nuclear weapon delivery, including large liquid- and solid-fuel ICBMs with the range to reach the United States, short-range missiles for tactical warheads, and its inaugural nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The use of the term “launch drill” instead of “test firing” in a recent ICBM launch suggests North Korea’s readiness to mass-produce and deploy Hwasong-18 ICBMs, according to Cheong Seong-chang, an expert on North Korea’s political strategy.
In a commentary, Seong-chang predicted that next year, North Korea would fortify its power posture by testing solid-fuel Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) from strategic nuclear attack submarines, and developing multi-warhead ICBMs.